The South Caucasus between risks and opportunities — Ramis Yunus

When I visited Azerbaijan several years ago to deliver lectures and spoke at a number of prestigious universities, one of the topics I proposed for discussion with students and faculty members was “Risks and Challenges, as well as the Window of Opportunity for the South Caucasus and Azerbaijan in Particular in the Context of Ongoing Geopolitical Processes.”

At the time, this sounded like an academic framing of the issue. Today, however, as we can see, it is far from being merely an academic question.

The world in which we live has changed so rapidly that many of yesterday’s geopolitical forecasts now appear almost like documents from a bygone era. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has continued for a fifth year and has been accompanied by a new escalation. Meanwhile, the armed confrontation between the United States and Iran continues in the Middle East, once again affecting not only regional security but also global energy markets and international trade.

And between these two major geopolitical flashpoints lies the South Caucasus.

That is precisely why today we need to speak not only about risks and challenges, but, above all, about the ability of the three states of the region — Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia — to assess these risks accurately, anticipate different scenarios in advance, and turn emerging opportunities into resources for their own security and development.

Because the greatest mistake a state can make in an era of global turbulence is not choosing the wrong side. The greatest mistake is misjudging the consequences of what is happening around it.

In this regard, the Russian-Ukrainian war is of fundamental importance to the South Caucasus, and it is necessary to speak about this with complete candor.

The South Caucasus cannot afford to regard this war as something distant and unrelated to our security. Russia is a direct neighbor of the region, and the outcome of the war will inevitably affect Russian foreign policy, its relations with neighboring states, and the entire post-Soviet space.

At the same time, it is entirely clear to the countries of the South Caucasus that, if a choice must be made between two possible outcomes — a Russian victory or a Russian defeat — a Russian defeat would be significantly more preferable in the interests of the region than a Russian victory.

Why?

Because a Russian victory would mean not merely a change in the front line in Ukraine. It could reinforce within Russia the belief that a policy of coercive pressure against neighboring states has produced results, which would constitute a direct challenge to all states situated along Russia’s periphery.

We are well aware of the ideas being voiced today in Russia’s information and expert communities. In Moscow, the question of where Russian “interests” end and the sovereign interests of neighboring states begin is by no means always interpreted in favor of the latter.

I recently wrote about this in an article entitled “The Caucasus Is Not a Russian Niche,” and today this thesis has become even more relevant.

However, an important clarification is necessary here, particularly for our Ukrainian friends: supporting Ukraine does not automatically mean entering the war.

The countries of the South Caucasus should support Ukraine’s struggle for its independence and territorial integrity — politically, morally, and humanitarily, as well as economically wherever possible. Ukraine is defending not only its territory today, but also a fundamental principle of international relations: the borders of states must not be changed by force.

However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia have their own security perimeters, their own threats, and their own responsibilities to their peoples. For this reason, direct military involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war does not serve the interests of the countries of the South Caucasus.

This is not neutrality between Russia as the aggressor and Ukraine as the victim. Rather, it is the responsible policy of a state that supports justice but is not obliged to open a second front along its own borders. At the same time, we must look not only at the scenario of a Russian victory: Russia’s defeat would also create serious risks.

If military defeat, economic problems, and social tensions within Russia begin to develop into a systemic political crisis, we may find ourselves facing not a strong and aggressive Russia, but an unstable Russia in our immediate neighborhood. And instability in a vast nuclear-armed state would itself constitute a serious challenge.

The history of modern Russia already includes a period commonly referred to as the “turbulent 1990s,” and all of Russia’s neighbors — particularly the countries of the South Caucasus — remember those bloody years all too well: Karabakh, Abkhazia, Tskhinvali... Therefore, it would be politically short-sighted to assume that Russia’s defeat would automatically usher in an era of tranquility for all its neighbors.

This creates a paradoxical situation: a Russian victory could strengthen its revanchism toward neighboring states, while a Russian defeat could intensify its internal instability.

That is precisely why the South Caucasus must be prepared not for a single scenario, but for several possible trajectories of events.

The same applies to Iran.

If the current authorities in Tehran fail to withstand the pressure and a political collapse occurs, the region will face an entirely new set of threats. Iran is a multiethnic state with an exceptionally complex internal structure. Consequently, a possible collapse of central authority could generate not only a struggle for power in Tehran, but also significant ethnopolitical processes, making this an extremely sensitive issue for all of Iran’s neighbors.

But the survival of the current regime does not necessarily mean an automatic return to the previous status quo.

If the authorities in Tehran manage to survive the current confrontation, they will almost inevitably seek to portray themselves as victorious, tighten internal controls, suppress opposition sentiment, and restore the previous system of governance. Whether they will succeed is another question, but the process itself could also generate serious risks.

Consequently, the South Caucasus today finds itself between two powerful geopolitical turbulences — in the north and in the south. This is precisely why we need not to seek another external patron, but to strengthen our own regional architecture of stability.

The first and most important element of this architecture should be a final peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and recent developments provide grounds for cautious optimism.

On August 31, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Bishkek on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. The very fact of contact between the two leaders, as well as the statements they made, deserves serious attention given the current geopolitical circumstances.

It is particularly important that the peace process between Baku and Yerevan is gradually ceasing to be exclusively a bilateral issue and is becoming a matter of the overall security of the South Caucasus.

The sooner Azerbaijan and Armenia finally close the chapter of armed conflict, the fewer opportunities external actors will have to use the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation as an instrument of their own influence. Here, Armenia faces a fundamental choice.

It can continue indefinitely to pursue a politics of historical grievances, seek external patrons, and retain in its legislation formulations that leave room for territorial claims; or it can acknowledge the new reality and open an entirely different chapter in its history.

Today, Azerbaijan is no longer the Azerbaijan that existed several decades ago. It is a state that has restored its territorial integrity, significantly strengthened its economic and military capabilities, expanded its diplomatic ties, and emerged as a regional middle power. Therefore, for Armenia, recognizing this new reality is not a defeat, but the beginning of a new policy.

Particularly important in this context is the issue of amendments to Armenia’s Constitution, which Prime Minister Pashinyan himself has also addressed.

If Armenia genuinely wants to finally close the conflict with Azerbaijan, its fundamental law should contain no provisions that could be interpreted as territorial claims against a neighboring state. A peace treaty must not merely be a political document; it must also become the legal foundation of a new South Caucasus. Only then will an entirely different space of opportunities emerge.

Peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia could also mark the beginning of the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Turkey, the opening of new communications, the development of trade and transport projects, and Armenia’s gradual integration into regional processes. This is particularly important for Armenia because peace with Azerbaijan is not a closure, but an opening of doors. And here, it is impossible not to discuss Turkey.

Turkey’s role in shaping the new balance in the South Caucasus cannot be overstated.

Over the past several years, we have witnessed a gradual transformation of the regional architecture: from the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Turkey to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey triangle, and subsequently to broader processes associated with the Organization of Turkic States, transport corridors, energy, and Azerbaijan’s growing role not only in the Caucasus but also in the wider regional space.

This is no longer merely a matter of ethnocultural affinity; it is a matter of geopolitics, economics, communications, and security.

Today, it is impossible to discuss stability in the South Caucasus without taking Turkey into account, and all three states of the region must understand this.

Georgia is already an important part of this system of regional interconnectedness. Its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey have long gone beyond ordinary neighborhood relations and acquired strategic substance, as maintaining and further strengthening this triangle is one of Georgia’s most important instruments for ensuring its own economic and political resilience.

Armenia’s situation, however, is different, and it still has to travel this path. The key to doing so lies precisely in normalizing relations with Azerbaijan, because only peace with Baku can pave the way for full normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and, consequently, for Armenia’s broader integration into the region’s economic and transport space.

Thus, Armenian-Azerbaijani peace is becoming not an endpoint, but a launching pad for a new regional order. This is perhaps one of the most important historical opportunities available to the South Caucasus.

But this process has another fundamental dimension: the South Caucasus must cease to perceive itself exclusively as an object of competition among external powers.

Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States, the European Union, China, and other actors have their own interests in the region, and this is normal. Major powers will always take an interest in territories of geographical, energy, and transportation significance. However, the interests of major powers must not automatically become the interests of small states. The countries of the South Caucasus must learn to speak the language of their own national interests.

The countries of the South Caucasus should not be “pro-Russian,” “pro-American,” “pro-Iranian,” or “pro-Chinese,” nor should even a Western orientation be turned into an end in itself.

They should be pro-Azerbaijani, pro-Georgian, and pro-Armenian — that is, they should be guided above all by their own national interests. This is how responsible states should act today.

In this respect, the South Caucasus has a unique window of opportunity.

The war in Ukraine has altered the significance of transport routes between Europe and Asia. The growing importance of the Middle Corridor is already strengthening the role of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey as an interconnected transport and economic space.

If this is combined with normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the opening of new communications, and Armenia’s gradual integration into the regional economic system, the South Caucasus could transform itself from a territory of permanent conflict into one of Eurasia’s most important communication hubs.

But peace is essential for this. That is why peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia benefits not only Baku and Yerevan.

It benefits Tbilisi, Ankara, and the entire South Caucasus and, looking more broadly, it benefits Europe and the international trading system as a whole.

However, another point must not be overlooked.

Even the most successful foreign-policy course becomes vulnerable if a state lacks social resilience from within. Here, I would like to address my compatriots in Azerbaijan separately.

We are living through a period in which an entirely new geopolitical reality is taking shape around our country.

Azerbaijan has come a very long way in recent years. Precisely for this reason, however, it is particularly important today to preserve one of the country’s most important resources — social cohesion.

The Second Karabakh War created a distinct sense of unity in Azerbaijani society and produced the very social consensus that enabled the state to withstand the most difficult challenges.

Today, we need this consensus no less than we did then, because the war has ended, but the era of risks has not. On the contrary, it has become more complex.

We must now simultaneously take into account developments in Russia, Ukraine, Iran, Turkey, the Middle East, Europe, and the global system of international relations.

For this very reason, internal divisions, political polarization, and attempts to undermine social consensus become an additional vulnerability for any state.

Azerbaijan today needs to continue preserving the social contract between the state and society that emerged during the most difficult periods of trial.

This does not mean that society should be devoid of differing opinions. On the contrary, a strong state is not afraid of debate. However, society must have fundamental national interests around which we all maintain strategic unity.

These are territorial integrity, sovereignty, national security, political stability within the country, peace in the region, and the ability to determine our own future independently.

It is around these principles that national consensus must be preserved, because the South Caucasus is now facing a rare historical window of opportunity, while at the same time the region is confronted with very real threats.

Russia may emerge from the war stronger and more revanchist — or it may enter a period of internal crisis. The Russian-Ukrainian war may end with the formation of a new European security order — or it may lead to an even longer period of confrontation.

Iran may preserve its current system of government — or it may face profound political upheaval. The U.S.-Iran confrontation may end in an agreement — or it may lead to an even more far-reaching crisis.

We cannot control these processes, but we can control our preparedness for them. And this is the principal task facing the South Caucasus.

We must not wait for the great powers to determine our fate, choose which of them will become our next patron, or turn the region into an arena for conflicts that are not our own. Instead, we must create a system of interdependence in which war becomes unprofitable and peace becomes beneficial.

To achieve this, it is necessary to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, strengthen the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey axis, develop relations with all neighbors on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, continue integration processes within the Organization of Turkic States, develop transport and energy connectivity, and, above all, preserve the internal resilience of each of the three South Caucasus states.

Because in the 21st century, a state’s security is determined not only by the number of tanks or missiles it possesses. It is also determined by the ability of society to maintain unity when the familiar geopolitical structures around it are collapsing.

Several years ago, I spoke to my students about the “risks, challenges, and window of opportunity” facing the South Caucasus.

Today, I would formulate this idea somewhat differently: we live in an era in which risk and opportunity have become two sides of the same historical situation.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is an enormous risk, but at the same time it creates a window for the formation of a new European and Eurasian order.

The crisis surrounding Iran is an enormous risk, but at the same time it is compelling the states of the region to reassess their own security in a new way.

Changes in transport routes are a challenge, but at the same time they represent a unique opportunity for Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.

Peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia is an exceptionally difficult political task, but at the same time it is a historic opportunity to transform the South Caucasus from the periphery of conflicts into a center of regional cooperation.

Therefore, it is particularly important today to look ahead and not ask only, “What will happen to us?” but to pose a different question: “What can we ourselves do to ensure that what is happening around us works in our interests?”

This question should today become the central question for the entire South Caucasus, and for Azerbaijan in particular. Our country has learned how to win a war; it must now learn to manage peace after war with no less success. To achieve this, we need not only a strong army and strong diplomacy, but also strategic thinking, regional peace, the ability to look beyond the present day, and, above all, the preservation of national unity within Azerbaijani society.

The South Caucasus genuinely has an opportunity today. History, however, never guarantees that such an opportunity will be seized. It becomes a historical outcome only when a state has the wisdom to recognize the opportunity and the political will to make use of it.

As Winston Churchill once said: “What a misfortune if this moment should find him unprepared.”

Ramiz Yunus

Professor of Political Science

Khazar International University